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PARTING IS SUCH SWEET SORROW: THE APPLICATION
OF TITLE VII TO POST-EMPLOYMENT
RETALIATION
PATRICIA A. MOORE
INTRODUCTION
Suppose that an employee charges her employer with racial discrimi-
nation. If the employer subsequently discharges that employee for mak-
ing the charge, the employee has a remedy under the anti-retaliation
provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.'
But suppose instead that an employee leaves her job and charges her
former employer with racial discrimination, claiming constructive dis-
charge.2 Later a prospective employer requests a reference from the ap-
plicant's former employer. If the former employer, in retaliation for the
ex-employee's initiation of a race discrimination suit, provides a negative
reference that prevents her from obtaining the new job, it is questionable
whether the former employee has a remedy under Title VII.
The debate surrounding this issue centers on differing interpretations
of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision. Section 704(a) of Title VII spe-
cifically protects both "employees" and "applicants for employment"
against employer retaliation.3 Because the provision does not include the
term "former employee," however, it is unclear whether a former em-
ployee has a cause of action under section 704(a) against a former em-
ployer for acts of retaliation that occur after the employment relationship
has ended.
Some federal circuit courts have found that the plain statutory lan-
guage of section 704(a) indicates that Congress intended to protect only
employees and applicants for employment.4 In other words, if Congress
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)
(1988)) ("§ 704(a)"); see, eg., Robinson v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 982 F.2d 892,
897 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that the firing of an employee who alleges race discrimination
in the workplace constitutes retaliation in violation of § 704(a)).
2. A plaintiff who claims constructive discharge must allege that her employer ren-
dered working conditions so intolerable as to compel the employee to quit voluntarily.
See Parratt v. City of Connersville, 737 F.2d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 1984), cert dismissed, 469
U.S. 1145 (1985); Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
3. Section 704(a) provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment,... because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this sub-
chapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in
any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1988).
4. See Polsby v. Chase, 970 F.2d 1360, 1365 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that Title VII
does not protect former employees against post-employment discrimination), vacated on
other grounds sub. nor. Polsby v. Shalala, 113 S. Ct. 1940 (1993); Reed v. Shepard, 939
F.2d 484, 492-93 (7th Cir. 1991) (same). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the
Polsby decision and remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit for reconsideration in light
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
also had intended to protect ex-employees who assert grievances for inci-
dents that occur after their employment relationship has ended, it could
have done so.' Other federal circuit courts have found that only a broad
reading of Title VII gives full effect to the statute's remedial purpose.6
This purpose, as justified by legislative history and policy rationales, is to
provide a remedy against employer retaliation related to a prospective,
present, or past employment relationship.7
This Note examines whether section 704(a) of Title VII protects for-
mer employees from post-employment retaliation. Part I discusses the
general policy issues underlying Title VII as revealed in the legislative
history and in courts' interpretations of the statute. Specifically, this Part
explores whether Congress enacted Title VII primarily to eradicate dis-
crimination solely in the workplace, or whether Congress was more
broadly concerned with general notions of equalitya-a reading that
would extend the scope of Title VII to protect former employees from
post-employment retaliation. Part II discusses judicial interpretations of
post-employment actions in the context of other Title VII provisions and
other remedial labor statutes. Part III examines the practical considera-
tions of applying section 704(a) in the post-employment context. This
Part proposes a two-step analysis that evaluates whether the post-em-
ployment actions are both (1) related to an employment relationship and
(2) in retaliation for activity protected under Title VII. This Note con-
cludes that the two-step analysis balances congressional intent in enact-
ing Title VII against the potential for unlimited employer liability, by
defining and restricting the post-employment actions covered by section
704(a).
of the Acting Solicitor General's brief filed March 5, 1993. See Brief for Respondents,
Polsby v. Shalala, 113 S. Ct. 1940 (1993) (No. 92-966) (on file at Fordham Law Review).
Although the government, in its brief, rejected the Fourth Circuit's position that former
employees are not covered under section 704(a), it argued that the issue was not ripe for
Supreme Court consideration because the parties did not brief or argue the issue in the
Court of Appeals. "[B]ecause the decision of the court of appeals constitutes an alterna-
tive ground for decision unnecessary to the result and does not rest on an adversary
presentation of the question, there is no reason for this Court to consider the question at
this time." Id. at 9. On June 17, 1993, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the
district court. See Polsby v. Chase, No. 92-1176 (4th Cir. June 17, 1993) (on file at
Fordham Law Review). The case (Docket No. HAR88-2344) has been assigned to Judge
John R. Hargrove, United States District Court, District of Maryland.
5. See Polsby, 970 F.2d at 1365.
6. See Sherman v. Burke Contracting, Inc., 891 F.2d 1527, 1532 (11 th Cir.) (holding
that Title VII protects former employees against post-employment discrimination), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 942 (1990); Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506, 1509-10 (11th Cir.
1988) (same); Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., 581 F.2d 1052, 1054-55 (2d Cir. 1978)
(same); Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir.
1977) (same).
7. See Sherman, 891 F.2d at 1535-36; Bailey, 850 F.2d at 1509-10; Pantchenko, 581
F.2d at 1054-55; Rutherford, 565 F.2d at 1165.
8. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971).
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I. TITLE VII-STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND CONGRESSIONAL
INTENT
Section 704(a) of Title VII states, in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to dis-
criminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment,
... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employ-
ment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.9
Based upon the language of this provision, it is unclear whether section
704(a) proscribes discrimination only in the current and prospective em-
ployer-employee relationship, or whether the provision also protects for-
mer employees against post-employment retaliation.
A. Strict Statutory Interpretation Versus Underlying Policy Concerns
Because there is disagreement as to whether the language of section
704(a) is ambiguous, courts have reached disparate conclusions as to the
intended meaning of the anti-retaliation provision. The Fourth Circuit,
for example, held that the language of section 704(a) is clear on its face.
In Polsby v. Chase,1° the court concluded that, because Congress in-
cluded "applicant for employment" as a person distinct from "em-
ployee" to be protected from retaliation, Congress would have also
included "former employee" if it so desired." The court reasoned that
Congress intentionally omitted "ex-employees" from the language of sec-
tion 704(a) in order to limit the remedies available under Title VII.'2
Under this "plain language" interpretation, section 704(a) does not pro-
tect ex-employees from retaliation after the employment relationship has
ended.13
Other courts, however, have interpreted the language of the anti-retali-
ation provision more broadly, presumably to maintain consistency with
congressional intent in the enactment of Title VII as a whole. In Pantch-
enko v. C. B. Dolge Co., 4 the Second Circuit held that a literal reading of
the language of section 704(a) would not give effect to Title VII's in-
tended remedial purpose. 5 The court explained that Congress distin-
guished between "applicants for employment" and "employees" in order
to establish that individuals who have not yet entered into an employ-
ment relationship have a cause of action against retaliation by prospec-
tive employers. The term "employees," however, encompasses an
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
10. 970 F.2d 1360 (4th Cir. 1992), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Polsby v.
Shalala, 113 S. Ct. 1940 (1993).
11. See id. at 1365.
12. See id at 1366.
13. See id at 1365-66; Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 492-93 (7th Cir. 1991).
14. 581 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1978).
15. See id. at 1054-55.
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established employment relationship-a relationship that is not necessar-
ily severed on the date of an employee's separation-and, therefore, in-
cludes former employees. "An applicant for employment, unlike a
former employee, may not be described as an 'employee.'... [O]nce an
employment relationship has been created, use of the term 'employee' in
referring to a former employee, while colloquial, is not inappropriate."' 6
Similarly, in Bailey v. USX Corp.,'7 the Eleventh Circuit held that
courts should not interpret individual statutory provisions in isolation
when a literal reading will defeat the underlying policies of the statute.18
In Bailey, the court found that interpreting section 704(a) according to
the plain meaning rule would defeat Congress' intent in enacting the stat-
ute.19 According to Bailey, "a strict and narrow interpretation of the
word 'employee' to exclude former employees would undercut the obvi-
ous remedial purposes of Title VII."2
As these cases demonstrate, in addition to the conflict over the mean-
ing of section 704(a), there is a broader disagreement as to whether
courts should narrowly construe statutes according to their "plain"
meaning or, alternatively, whether courts should look to the statute's
purpose and legislative history in order to determine congressional in-
tent.2 The conflicting opinions of courts as to the meaning of section
704(a) reveals, however, that the language of this provision is subject to
16. Id. at 1055.
17. 850 F.2d 1506 (lth Cir. 1988).
18. See id. at 1509; see also Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d
487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) ("[I]t is a commonplace that a literal interpretation of the words
of a statute is not always a safe guide to its meaning.") (citations omitted).
19. See 850 F.2d at 1509.
20. Id; see also EEOC v. Metzger, No. CIV.A.93-0028(CRR), 1993 WL 214237, at *1
(D.D.C. June 16, 1993) (quoting Bailey, 850 F.2d at 1509-10, with approval); Bilka v.
Pepe's Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1254, 1259 (N.D. Ill. 1985) ("If [a] narrow reading of the
statute were correct, employers could easily retaliate against former employees against
whom they have discriminated."). In addition, both the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and the Acting Solicitor General have adopted the position that former em-
ployees are protected under section 704(a). See 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA)
§ 614.7(f)(1), at 614:0034 (1988); Brief for Respondents at 9, Polsby v. Shalala, 113 S. Ct.
1940 (1993) (No. 92-966) (on file at Fordham Law Review).
21. See West Va. Univ. Hosp. Inc. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138, 1153-54 (1991) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("In recent years, the Court has vacillated between a purely literal ap-
proach to the task of statutory interpretation and an approach that seeks guidance from
historical context, legislative history, and prior cases identifying the purpose that moti-
vated the legislation."). Indeed, scholars, practitioners, and judges have written numer-
ous articles both condemning and praising the judicial use of legislative history in
statutory interpretation. For examples of articles discussing the use of legislative history
in statutory interpretation, see Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History In In-
terpreting Statutes, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 845 (1992); Reed Dickerson, Statutory Interpreta-
tion: Dipping Into Legislative History, 11 Hofstra L. Rev. 1125 (1983); William T.
Mayton, Law Among the Pleonasms: The Futility and Aconstitutionality of Legislative
History in Statutory Interpretation, 41 Emory L.J. 113 (1992); W. David Slawson, Legis-
lative History and the Need to Bring Statutory Interpretation Under the Rule of Law, 44
Stan. L. Rev. 383 (1992); Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative
History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 195 (1983).
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more than one interpretation; therefore, the "plain" meaning analysis
may prove inconclusive. In addition, when interpreting Title VII, the
Supreme Court frequently consults the statute's legislative history, if
only to confirm that a literal reading of the language comports with con-
gressional intent.' For these reasons, Title VII's legislative history may
provide some guidance as to the intended scope and application of sec-
tion 704(a). 3
B. Legislative History and Congressional Intent
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was introduced against the backdrop of
considerable civil unrest in the United States. 24 In 1963, eight days prior
to sending the proposed civil rights bill to Congress, President John F.
Kennedy gave a televised speech to the American public outlining his
intended purposes in promoting the legislation:
We are confronted primarily with a moral issue. It is as old as the
Scriptures and it is as clear as the American Constitution. The heart of
the question is whether all Americans are to be afforded equal rights
and equal opportunities, whether we are going to treat our fellow
Americans as we want to be treated .... I shall ask the Congress of
the United States to act, to make a commitment it has not fully made
in this century to the proposition that race has no place in American
life or law.-
Under these initial directives, the President presented Congress with the
task of enacting a "strong civil rights bill" that included comprehensive
22. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, III S. Ct. 2395, 2413 (1991); International Union,
United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111
S. Ct. 1196, 1204, 1206-07 (1991); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243
(1989); Karahalios v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527, 533
(1989); Federal Labor Relations Auth. v. Aberdeen Proving Ground, 485 U.S. 409, 412-
13 (1988); EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115-16 (1988); Espi-
noza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88-89 (1973).
23. See also United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) ("The plain
meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the 'rare cases [in which] the literal
application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of
its drafters.' In such cases, the intention of the drafters, rather than the strict language,
controls.") (citations omitted); Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, 426
U.S. 1, 10 (1976) ("When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the
statute, is available, there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however
clear the words may appear on 'superficial examination.' ") (citations omitted); Continen-
tal Can Co. v. Mellon, 825 F.2d 308, 310 (11th Cir. 1987) ("When faced with various...
interpretations of a statute, it is appropriate for a court to look to legislative history as a
guide to its meaning."); United States v. Noe, 634 F.2d 860, 861 (5th Cir.) (same), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 876 (1981); Bell v. Brown, 557 F.2d 849, 853 (D.D.C. 1977) ("The
initial guidepost is the consideration that 'where congressional purpose is unclear, courts
have traditionally resolved ambiguities in remedial statutes in favor of those whom the
legislation was designed to protect.' ") (citations omitted).
24. See Charles Whalen & Barbara Whalen, The Longest Debate at xviii-xx (1985).
25. See id at xx.
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provisions prohibiting discrimination in employment.26
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196427 applies this mandate to the
labor and employment context. The statute was the result of an "epic
legislative struggle"28 that included over 100 amendments during the leg-
islative process.29 Due to the extensive congressional debate30 and the
protracted compromise necessary to ensure Title VII's enactment, the
statute's provisions are contradictory and the legislative history is
unclear.31
In particular, the legislative history provides no guidance as to
whether Congress intended post-employment retaliation to be covered
under Title VII. For example, an interpretive memorandum dated April
8, 1964 merely discusses the statute's prohibition of adverse employer
actions against "persons" who oppose discriminatory practices or who
file charges under the statute.32 No mention is made as to whether such
persons include former employees. 33 Review of other congressional anal-
yses and comments on the anti-retaliation provision provides no addi-
tional insight on this issue.34
Although the legislative history of Title VII furnishes little interpreta-
tive guidance on the anti-retaliation provision itself, it does state Con-
gress' overall intent in enacting the statute. Title VII was enacted to
establish a "national policy of nondiscrimination" in employment and to
forbid "[d]iscrimination by those who control employment and promo-
26. See id. at xix. The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 explains the
statute's effect as follows:
The depth, the revolutionary meaning of this act, is almost beyond description.
It cannot be circumscribed, it cannot be said that it goes this far and no farther.
The language written into the bill ... has open-ended provisions that give it
whatever depth and intensity one desires to read into it.
1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437.
27. Codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e(17) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
28. Howard McCoach, Applying Title VII to Partners: One Step Beyond, 20 Rutgers
L.J. 741, 743-44 (1989).
29. See Herbert Hill, The Equal Employment Opportunity Acts of 1964 and 1972: A
Critical Analysis of the Legislative History and Administration of the Law, 2 Indus. Rel.
L.J. 1, 2 (1977).
30. See EEOC, Legislative History of Titles VII and XI of Civil Rights Act of 1964,
at 11 (1969) [hereinafter EEOC, Legislative History] ("According to the records, the
measure was considered and debated by the House Judiciary Committee 22 days, by the
Rules Committee seven days, by the House six days, and by the Senate 83 days. The
extended debate in the Senate lasted 534 hours, 1 minute and 37 seconds.").
31. See Hill, supra note 29, at 2; see also Johnson v. Seaboard Airline R.R., 405 F.2d
645, 649 (4th Cir. 1968) ("[D]uring the [congressional] debate ... totally inconsistent
explanations of [Title VII] were offered by its proponents and its opponents."), cert. de-
nied, 394 U.S. 918 (1969); Mondy v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 271 F. Supp. 258, 262
(E.D. La. 1967) ("[T]he legislative history [of Title VII] is not... clear .... [B]oth sides
can find some comfort in the Congressional Record.").
32. See 110 Cong. Rec. at 7213, reprinted in EEOC, Legislative History, supra note
30, at 3040.
33. See id.
34. See, e.g., 110 Cong. Rec. 13170, reprinted in EEOC, Legislative History, supra
note 30, at 3120.
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tion[ I .... Congress intended the statute to achieve "equality of
employment opportunities" 36 for workers and job applicants and to send
a definitive message that discriminatory employment practices would not
be tolerated. 37 Furthermore, Congress' enactment of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991,38 which amended Title VII to expand its remedial scope,
demonstrates Congress' present intent that Title VII should not be nar-
rowly construed.39
The purpose of Title VII, therefore, is to achieve fairness in employ-
ment practices. Courts have the duty to ensure that "the Act works, and
the intent of Congress is not hampered by a combination of strict con-
struction of the statute and a battle with semantics."' In keeping with
the remedial nature of the statute, courts should liberally interpret the
statutory provisions4' to provide individuals with a remedy against em-
ployer retaliation. As discussed in the sections that follow, this reading
of the anti-retaliation provision is supported by judicial analyses of other
Title VII provisions and judicial interpretations of other remedial labor
statutes.
II. SUPPORT FROM OTHER PROVISIONS OF TITLE VII AND OTHER
REMEDIAL LABOR STATUTES
Courts have held that other Title VII provisions and other remedial
labor statutes protect against post-employment discrimination. Judicial
35. 110 Cong. Rec. 13169 (1964), reprinted in EEOC, Legislative History, supra note
30, at 3119; see also H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2401 (Title VII's purpose was "to eliminate, through the utilization of
formal and informal remedial procedures, discrimination in employment based on race,
color, religion, or national origin.").
36. Shehadeh v. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co., 595 F.2d 711, 721 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971)). In Griggs, the
Court explained:
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the lan-
guage of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities
.... What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to
discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification.
401 U.S. at 429-3 1.
37. See Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970).
38. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
39. One of the purposes of the statute is "to respond to recent decisions of the
Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes." .d. at 1071. See
also infra note 85 for a discussion of additional Title VII remedies provided by the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.
40. Culpepper v. Reynolds Metal Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970); see also Parr
v. Woodman of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1986) (same);
Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 462 F.2d 1331, 1333 (5th Cir. 1972) (same), aff'd, 414 U.S.
86 (1973).
41. See Culpepper, 421 F.2d at 891 n.3; see also Coles v. Penny, 531 F.2d 609, 615
(D.C. Cir. 1976) ("Title VII is remedial in character and should be liberally construed to
achieve its purposes."); Henderson v. Eastern Freight Ways, Inc., 460 F.2d 258, 260 (4th
Cir. 1972) (same), cert denied, 419 U.S. 912 (1973).
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interpretations of these provisions and statutes provide a useful frame-
work for analyzing section 704(a) in the post-employment context.
A. Support From Other Provisions of Title VII
Interpreting section 704(a) to provide former employees with a remedy
against post-employment retaliation is consistent with judicial interpreta-
tions of other Title VII provisions. In Shehadeh v. Chesapeake & Poto-
mac Telephone Co.,42 for example, the court held that section 703(a)(1)
of Title VII,4 3 which prohibits unlawful employment discrimination, ap-
plies when an employer unlawfully interferes with a former employee's
future employment opportunities.' In Shehadeh, a former employee
brought a claim under section 703(a)(1) alleging that her former em-
ployer sent unfavorable references to a prospective employer because of
her gender and her husband's ancestry.45 The court found that the plain-
tiff had stated a claim under section 703(a)(1) of Title VII even though
42. 595 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
43. Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
Codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
Note that § 703(a)(1) protects "individuals" whereas § 704(a) protects "employees"
and "applicants for employment." See supra note 3. Based upon the different language
used in the two provisions, the scope of § 703(a)(1) arguably differs from the scope of
§ 704(a). The Shehadeh court, however, did not predicate its finding that former employ-
ees are covered under § 703(a)(1) on the fact that the provision's language specified "indi-
viduals" rather than "employees" or "applicants for employment." See Shehadeh, 595
F.2d at 721-23. To the contrary, the court cited both Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., 581
F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1978), and Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d
1162 (10th Cir. 1977), as support for its conclusion that former employees are covered
under § 703(a)(1). See Shehadeh, 595 F.2d at 720-21 n.44.
Moreover, in Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir 1973), the
court held that non-employees were covered under § 703(a)(1). See infra notes 50-51 and
accompanying text. The court recognized that Congress' use of the word "individual"
rather than "employee" in § 703(a)(1) made the provision somewhat unique. See Sibley,
488 F.2d at 1341. However, the court found that this difference in terminology allowed
the broader protection of non-employees under § 703(a)(1) rather than "only former em-
ployees and applicants for employment, in addition to present employees." Id. (emphasis
added). Therefore, because § 704(a) uses the term "employee" rather than "individual,"
it would appear that the Sibley court would allow the coverage of former employees but
not non-employees under § 704(a). The issue of whether non-employees are covered
under § 704(a) is beyond the scope of this Note.
In addition, there is no legislative history indicating that Congress intended § 703(a)(1)
to be broader in scope or remedial protection than § 704(a). See H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2402-03. For all of these reasons, Con-
gress' use of "individual" in § 703(a)(1), in contrast to the use of "employees" and "appli-
cants for employment" in § 704(a), does not appear to distinguish the two provisions with
respect to their coverage of former employees.
44. See Shehadeh, 595 F.2d at 719-23.
45. See id. at 719-20.
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she had left her position with her former employer:
This broad statutory language hardly lacks a potential for intercepting
discriminatory efforts by former employers to dissuade prospective em-
ployers from engaging discharged employees .... Denial of employ-
ment on grounds of sex or national origin is as repugnant to the
legislative goal [of equality of employment opportunities] when in-
duced by a former employer as when perpetuated directly by an em-
ployer with whom a job is sought.47
Thus, the Shehadeh court held that even though Title VII does not
explicitly provide ex-employees with a remedy against their former em-
ployer, courts should interpret section 703(a)(1) to protect former em-
ployees against post-employment discrimination in order to carry out
Congress' intent in enacting the statute. If Title VII protects former em-
ployees under section 703(a)(1), Title VII should also protect these indi-
viduals against post-employment retaliation under section 704(a).4"
In addition to finding that section 703(a)(1) protects ex-employees, at
least one court has held that section 703(a)(1) also protects non-employ-
ees.49 In Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson,5 ° a male private duty nurse
filed a sex discrimination suit against a hospital for allegedly failing to
refer him to female patients who requested private nursing care. Because
patients hired the nurse directly, the nurse was not an employee of the
hospital. Consistent with Congress' objective to achieve equal opportuni-
ties in employment, the court interpreted section 703(a)(1) to protect
non-employees against discrimination even though these individuals had
never worked nor ever intended to work for the party discriminating
against them. Specifically, the court stated:
To permit a covered employer to exploit circumstances peculiarly af-
fording it the capability of discriminatorily interfering with an individ-
ual's employment opportunities with another employer, while it could
not do so with respect to employment in its own service, would be to
condone continued use of the very criteria for employment that Con-
gress has prohibited."'
46. See iL at 721.
47. Id
48. The Shehadeh court cited both Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., 581 F.2d 1052 (2d
Cir. 1978) (holding that § 704(a) provides a remedy against post-employment retaliation)
and Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1977) (same).
Shehadeh, 595 F.2d at 720 n.44. The Shehadeh court noted that both § 703(a)(1) and
§ 704(a) may provide a cause of action against a former employer for the discriminatory
issuance of negative references. See id at 721 n.44; see also supra note 43 (discussing the
language of § 703(a)(1)).
49. See supra note 43.
50. 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
51. Ia at 1341; see also Vanguard Justice Soc'y v. Hughes, 471 F. Supp. 670, 696 (D.
Md. 1979) ("[T]he term 'employer,' as it is used in Title VII, is sufficiently broad to
encompass any party who significantly affects access of any individual to employment
opportunities, regardless of whether that party may technically be described as an 'em-
ployer' of an aggrieved individual as that term has generally been defined at common
law.").
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Thus, applying section 703(a)(1) to cover both former employees and
non-employees supports the conclusion that the anti-retaliation provision
of section 704(a) is also intended to protect former employees. In addi-
tion, as discussed below, judicial interpretation of other remedial labor
statutes also supports this liberal reading of section 704(a).
B. Support From Other Remedial Labor Statutes
In addition to finding that section 703(a)(1) of Title VII applies in the
post-employment context, courts have also held that other remedial labor
statutes protect former employees. These findings provide additional
support for the application of section 704(a) to post-employment
retaliation.
1. The Fair Labor Standards Act and the National
Labor Relations Act
Title VII is part of Congress' continuing effort over the past fifty years
to provide increased statutory protection for employees.52 Recognizing
Congress' progressive efforts in employment law, courts interpreting Ti-
tle VII have been persuaded by judicial analyses of other labor statutes
such as the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 3 (the "FLSA") and the
National Labor Relations Act54 (the "NLRA")." As with Title VII,
Congress intended the FLSA to be a "broadly remedial and humanita-
rian statute."56 The FLSA was an "ambitious effort to [increase] wages
and influence the length of the workweek."' 57 Congress enacted the
NLRA to protect workers in their organizational efforts and union activ-
ity and to provide for peaceful resolution of industrial disputes. 8
Like Title VII, the FLSA and the NLRA were enacted to correct per-
ceived inequities and imbalances in the workplace. For example, both
the FLSA and the NLRA contain anti-retaliation provisions that are
similar to section 704(a) of Title VII.59 It is not surprising, then, that
courts interpreting section 704(a) have turned for guidance to cases that
52. See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 723-24 (1947); Dunlop v.
Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139, 143 (6th Cir. 1977).
53. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
54. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
55. See Dunlop, 548 F.2d at 142-43; Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565
F.2d 1162, 1165-66 (10th Cir. 1977); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d
998, 1005-06 (5th Cir. 1969).
56. Dunlop, 548 F.2d at 143.
57. Sanford Cohen, Labor Law 58 (1964); see also Rutherford Food Corp. v. Mc-
Comb, 331 U.S. 722, 727 (1947) (The FLSA was "[a]n effort to eliminate low wages and
long hours [in order to] free commerce from the interferences arising from production of
goods under conditions that were detrimental to the health and well-being of workers.").
58. See Barbara Lindemann Schlei & Paul Grossman, Employment Discrimination
Law 698 (2d ed. 1983 & Supp. 1989).
59. Section 8(a)(4) of the NLRA provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
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have interpreted the anti-retaliation provisions of the NLRA and the
FLSA. For example, in Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.," the
Fifth Circuit found support from section 8(a)(4) of the NLRA61 and sec-
tion 15(a)(3) of the FLSA62 in its interpretation of section 704(a) of Title
VII.63 The court noted that although there are differences among the
statutes, the similarities between the anti-retaliation provisions of Title
VII, the NLRA, and the FLSA support the conclusion "that protection
must be afforded to those who seek the benefit of statutes designed by
Congress to equalize employer and employee in matters of employ-
ment."" In fact, the court found the language of Title VII to be broader
than that contained in the NLRA and the FLSA,65 providing further
support for a liberal reading of section 704(a).
(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has
filed charges or given testimony under this subchapter.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1988).
Section 15(a)(3) of the FLSA provides, in pertinent part:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person-
(3) to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee be-
cause such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be insti-
tuted any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about
to testify in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an indus-
try committee.
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1988).
Note that section 704(a) of Title VII covers both "applicants for employment" and
"employees," see supra note 3, whereas the anti-retaliation provisions of the FLSA and
NLRA cover only "employees." Based upon this distinction, a court such as the Fourth
Circuit in Polsby v. Chase, 970 F.2d 1360 (4th Cir. 1992), vacated on other grounds sub
nora Polsby v. Shalala, 113 S. Ct. 1940 (1993), could assert that § 15(a)(3) of the FLSA
and § 8(a)(4) of the NLRA are broader than § 704(a) of Title VII, and therefore that the
FLSA and NLRA should not be used as persuasive support for Title VII. The Polsby
court stated that because "Congress considered it necessary to add 'applicant for employ-
ment' as a person distinct from 'employee' to be protected from retaliation, Congress
could certainly have also included a former employee if it had desired." Id. at 1365; see
supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. Based on the Polsby court's reasoning, the
inclusion of "applicants for employment" demonstrates Congress' intent to limit the cov-
erage under § 704(a). It would follow that because Congress did not use such limiting
language in the anti-retaliation provisions of the FLSA and the NLRA, the provisions
were intended to have a broader remedial scope.
However, the better argument may well be that § 704(a) protects "applicants for em-
ployment" in addition to "employees" because Congress determined that it was necessary
to protect individuals who had not yet entered into an employment relationship against
retaliation by potential employers. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text. Based
on this reasoning, § 704(a) may well be broader than the anti-retaliation provisions of the
FLSA and the NLRA. See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
60. 411 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1969).
61. See supra note 59.
62. See supra note 59.
63. See Pettway, 411 F.2d at 1005-06.
64. Id at 1006.
65. See id at 1005-06, 1006 n.18 ("The protective provisions of Title VII are substan-
tially broader than even those included in the Fair Labor Standards Act and the National
Labor Relations Act .... This indicates the exceptionally broad protection intended for
protestors of discriminatory employment practices.").
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Similarly, in Ford v. Alfaro, 6 a case involving an unlawful discharge
claim, the Ninth Circuit specifically looked to the anti-retaliation provi-
sions of Title VII and the NLRA when interpreting section 15(a)(3) of
the FLSA. 67 The court found that section 15(a)(3) is analogous to the
anti-retaliation provisions contained in section 8(a)(4) of the NLRA and
section 704(a) of Title VII. 6s The court, therefore, held that "the case
authority interpreting these analogous provisions [in the NLRA and Ti-
tle VII] is instructive in the context of the FLSA."69
Significantly, courts have found post-employment retaliation by a for-
mer employer to be actionable under the FLSA. In Hodgson v. Charles
Martin Inspectors of Petroleum, Inc.,7 former employees had cooperated
in a government investigation against their former employer. In light of
the potential need to obtain references from their former employer, the
court held that the possibility of future retaliation against these ex-em-
ployees by the employer was significant: "In such a case the former em-
ployee would stand the same risk of retaliation as the present employee.
There is no ground for affording any less protection to ... former em-
ployees than to ... present employees."'"
Similarly, at least one court has held that post-employment retaliation
violates section 8(a)(4) of the NLRA even though the statute does not
explicitly mention "former" employees.72 In NLRB v. Whitfield Pickle
Co. ,7 an employer refused to rehire a former employee allegedly because
she had filed unfair labor practice charges against her employer. The
court concluded that, regardless of whether the former employee actually
proved the unfair labor practice charges, the employer's discriminatory
refusal to rehire the individual violated the NLRA's anti-retaliation
provision.74
66. 785 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1986).
67. See id. at 840 & n. 1.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 840.
70. 459 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1972).
71. Id. at 306 (citing Wirtz v. B.A.C. Steel Prods., Inc., 312 F.2d 14 (4th Cir. 1962)).
It should be noted that the actual claim in Hodgson was not brought under § 15(a)(3), the
anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA. Rather, the court used the example of an em-
ployer sending unfavorable post-employment references to demonstrate that former em-
ployees are not removed from the threat of retaliation. See id. Although it is dictum, the
example demonstrates the court's opinion that former employees would be protected
under the FLSA. See Dole v. International Ass'n Managers, Inc., Civ. No. 90-0219PHX
RCB, 1991 WL 270194 at *3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 2, 1991) (citing Hodgson, 459 F.2d at 305,
for the proposition that the threat of retaliation exists for former as well as current em-
ployees); Brock v. Frank V. Panzarino, Inc., 109 F.R.D. 157, 158 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)
(citing Hodgson, 459 F.2d at 305, for the proposition that "[r]etaliation [may] take the
form of a refusal to rehire or of providing a future employer with a negative reference").
72. See supra note 59.
73. 374 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1967).
74. See id. at 582-83.
[Vol. 62
POST-EMPLOYMENT RETALIATION
2. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
In addition to the FLSA and the NLRA, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 19677" ("ADEA"), as amended in 1978, also sup-
ports a broad reading of section 704(a). The ADEA protects individuals
over the age of 40 against employment discrimination.76 The statute is
essentially a hybrid of Title VII and the FLSA-the ADEA prohibitions
are analogous to those of Title VII," while the ADEA remedies replicate
those of the FLSA.78 Thus, because the ADEA is a remedial employ-
ment statute with strong similarities to both Title VII and the FLSA,
judicial interpretation of the ADEA also provides persuasive support for
the intended scope of section 704(a).
For example, in EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc. ,7 the court held that the anti-
retaliation provision of the ADEA80 protects former employees even
though the statutory language mentions only "employees."'" In Cos-
mair, an employer refused to continue severance payments to a former
employee allegedly because the individual had filed an age discrimination
charge against the employer. Specifically relying on Title VII and FLSA
cases, 2 the court held that the failure to pay severance arose directly
from the employment relationship, and therefore courts should broadly
interpret the statute to cover former employees.83
As these cases show, courts have consistently held that the anti-retalia-
tion provisions of the FLSA, the NLRA, and the ADEA protect former
employees." Moreover, Title VII should be interpreted consistently with
75. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
76. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1988 & Supp. 1991); Schlei & Grossman, supra note 58, at
482.
77. See Lorillard Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978) ("IThe prohibitions of the
ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title VII.").
78. See id at 584-85.
79. 821 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1987).
80. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (1988). This section provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of his employ-
ees or applicants for employment... because such individual... has opposed
any practice made unlawful by this section, or because such individual ... has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investiga-
tion, proceeding, or litigation under this chapter.
kL Note that the language of this provision is virtually identical to the language of
§ 704(a) of Title VII. See supra note 3.
81. Cosmair, 821 F.2d at 1088-89.
82. See id. (citing Pantchenko v. C. B. Dolge, Inc., 581 F.2d 1052, 1055 (2d Cir.
1978); Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162, 1165-66 (10th Cir.
1977); Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139, 147 (6th Cir. 1977); Hodgson v.
Charles Martin Inspectors of Petroleum, Inc., 459 F.2d 303, 306 (5th Cir. 1972)).
83. See id.; see also Passer v. American Chem. Soe'y, 935 F.2d 322, 330-31 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (The ADEA protects the complainant "even after he... ceased to be an active
employee .... To read the statute otherwise would be to deny protection to any person
who has suffered discharge or termination due to unlawful discrimination. Obviously
Congress could not have intended such an absurd result.").
84. Courts appear to be unanimous on the issue of whether the FLSA, the NLRA,
and the ADEA protect former employees against post-employment retaliation. See
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other remedial labor statutes unless it can be discerned that Title VII has
a clearly different purpose. Because Title VII, like these other statutes, is
a remedial labor statute, and contains a comparable anti-retaliation pro-
vision, courts should adopt a similar view in interpreting the scope of
section 704(a).
III. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF APPLYING SECTION 704(A) IN
THE POST-EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT
Those courts that have limited Title VII to protecting only current
employees and applicants for employment have done so out of concern
that extending protection to former employees may expose employers to
highly "speculative" and unlimited liability."5 These courts have con-
cluded that because this liability arises from retaliation occurring after
the employment relationship has ended, the employer's action cannot be
considered an unlawful employment practice under Title VII. 86 There-
EEOC v. J.M. Huber Corp., 927 F.2d 1322, 1331 (5th Cir. 1991); Passer, 935 F.2d at 330-
31; Cosmair, 821 F.2d at 1088-89; Hodgson v. Charles Martin Inspectors of Petroleum,
Inc., 459 F.2d 303, 306 (5th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Whitfield Pickle Co., 374 F.2d 576,
582-83 (5th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Syracuse Stamping Co., 208 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1953);
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 483, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
85. See Polsby v. Chase, 970 F.2d 1360, 1366 (4th Cir. 1992), vacated on other
grounds sub nom. Polsby v. Shalala, 113 S. Ct. 1940 (1993). According to the Polsby
court, the remedies available under Title VII are limited to equitable relief such as rein-
statement, back pay, and injunctions against further violations. See id.; see also Eastman
v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., 939 F.2d 204, 208 (4th Cir. 1991) (same).
The court determined that such equitable remedies would be insufficient to compensate
former employees who sought a remedy against the retaliatory interference with future
employment opportunities. Rather, legal remedies such as compensatory and punitive
damages would be necessary to compensate victims of post-employment retaliation, and
therefore the court held that the statute does not protect former employees. See Polsby,
970 F.2d at 1366 ("While relief must be in the form of making the former employee
whole as if the retaliatory act had not occurred, the equitable means to accomplish this
goal are lacking. Such relief would entail calculating future damages and is far too specu-
lative.").
The Polsby court was not alone in limiting the remedies available under Title VII.
Even courts that allow former employees to recover legal remedies under the statute have
held that such remedies include compensatory but not punitive damages. See Sherman v.
Burke Contracting, Inc., 891 F.2d 1527, 1535-36 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 943
(1990). Based upon these judicial limitations and recognizing that additional remedies
were needed to deter harassment and discrimination in the workplace, Congress enacted
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991), which amended
Title VII.
The enactment of this statute resolves the debate over which remedies are allowed
under Title VII. Section 102(a)(1) of the statute allows the complaining party to recover
both compensatory and punitive damages in a suit under § 704(a): "In an action brought
by a complaining party ... against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional
discrimination.., prohibited under section 703, 704, or 717 of the Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e-
2 or 2000e-3),... the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive dam-
ages .... " Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072 (1991).
Therefore, based on the amendments to Title VII included in the Civil Rights Act of
1991, the ability to obtain legal relief under the statute is an additional argument for
extending § 704(a) protection to former employees.
86. See Polsby, 970 F.2d at 1365.
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fore, proponents of strict statutory interpretation argue that former em-
ployees must assert such grievances either against former employers
under state or other federal law or against prospective employers under
Title VII 7
Congress, of course, did not intend the remedies available under Title
VII to expose employers to limitless liability for post-employment occur-
rences. For example, the mere fact that a former employer and a former
employee were once engaged in a relationship covered under Title VII
does not automatically bring all of their future dealings under the protec-
tions of the statute. Conversely, however, if the "employment relation-
ship" were narrowly construed so as to terminate automatically when an
employee ceases to be included on the payroll, the statute would not pro-
tect any post-employment action, even if clearly retaliatory and related to
employment. Such an interpretation would seem to frustrate the con-
gressional intent behind Title VII. 8 Therefore, in order to balance con-
gressional objectives in the enactment of the statute against the potential
for statutory abuse in the post-employment context, section 704(a)
should protect former employees only when the post-employment actions
are both retaliatory and related to employment.
This reasoning suggests a two-step analysis to determine whether an
allegation of post-employment retaliation is actionable under section
704(a) of Title VII. Step one would require the plaintiff to establish that
the conduct at issue is related to an employment relationship. Step two
would require the plaintiff to establish that the defendant's actions were
retaliatory within the meaning of section 704(a).
87. See iL at 1366; Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 493 (7th Cir. 1991). Based on this
reasoning, a former employer who sends retaliatory references concerning an ex-em-
ployee would be free from liability under Title VII, but a potential employer who accepts
such references and fails to hire the ex-employee could violate the statute. But cf
Charles R. Richey, Manual on Employment Discrimination Law and Civil Rights Ac-
tions in the Federal Courts A-13 (1988) (stating that future employers who make hiring
decisions based on such references are not liable under the statute, while citing a case that
does not support this proposition and an unpublished decision that may not be cited as
precedent according to the local rules of the issuing circuit). Not only does such a result
defeat the purposes of Title VII, see supra notes 24-41 and accompanying text, but it also
presumes that the potential employer knows that the references are retaliatory. Suppose,
for example, that the former employer retaliates against a former employee by dissemi-
nating an unfounded, derogatory reference to a potential employer without disclosing the
fact that the former employee filed a charge under Title VII. Assuming there is no reason
to disbelieve these references, the potential employer would have a valid, non-discrimina-
tory reason for failing to hire the individual and, therefore, would not violate § 704(a). If
the statute is construed narrowly in this situation, former employees have absolutely no
recourse under Title VII even though they are clearly the victims of discrimination within
the meaning of § 704(a). Congress certainly did not intend for these individuals to seek
state or other federal remedies under such circumstances.
Because a former and a potential employer could simultaneously violate § 704(a) in the
case of retaliatory referencing, perhaps there is an argument for joint and several liability
under Title VII in this unique situation. Such a discussion, however, is beyond the scope
of this Note.
88. See supra notes 24-41 and accompanying text.
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A. Step One: Establishing that Post-Employment Actions Are Related
to an Employment Relationship
In order to ensure that section 704(a) protections are not abused, for-
mer employees should be required to prove that the allegedly culpable
conduct by the former employer is related to an employment relation-
ship. For example, in Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local 47, 89 the court
held that the protections of Title VII apply only when there is some
"connection" to the employment relationship itself.90 The court noted
that this connection need not be direct, however, as when an employer
interferes with an individual's employment opportunities with another
employer.91 In addition, in Pantchenko v. C. B. Dolge Co.,92 the court
explained that Title VII "prohibits discrimination related to or arising
out of an employment relationship, whether or not the person discrimi-
nated against is an employee at the time of the discriminatory con-
duct."9 3 Even the court in Polsby v. Chase,94 although strictly construing
the statute to exclude former employees, acknowledged that the practices
prohibited by Title VII "are those particularly related to employment."95
Two post-employment practices that are related to an employment re-
lationship include the sending of references96 and the payment of sever-
ance. 97 For example, prospective employers almost invariably require
job applicants to provide the names of their previous employers as refer-
ences on a job application,98 and regularly contact these references to
obtain information about the applicant's performance during the previ-
ous employment relationship. Similarly, the calculation and payment of
89. 633 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1980).
90. See id. at 883.
91. See id. at 883 & n.3. For a discussion of other Title VII cases examining interfer-
ence with future employment opportunities see supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
92. 581 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1978).
93. Id. at 1055; see also Bilka v. Pepe's Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1254, 1259 (N.D. Ill. 1985)
("Section 704 was plainly written to protect employees who assert Title VII rights. If an
employee asserts her rights after the relationship is over, her assertion nevertheless grows
out of that relationship.").
94. 970 F.2d 1360 (4th Cir. 1992), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Polsby v.
Shalala, 113 S. Ct. 1940 (1993).
95. Id. at 1365.
96. See, e.g., Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506, 1509 (1 lth Cir. 1988) (discussing
post-employment referencing); Pantchenko v. C. B. Dolge Co., 581 F.2d 1052, 1055 (2d
Cir. 1978) (same); Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162, 1165
(10th Cir. 1977) (same). In Sherman v. Burke Contracting, Inc., 891 F.2d 1527 (11 th
Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 943 (1990), the court went even farther to hold that an em-
ployer violates Title VII if it persuades a former employee's new employer to fire the
employee. See id. at 1532 ("[T]he distinction between a blacklisting that prevents a for-
mer employee from obtaining a new job and similar conduct that causes him to lose a new
job is meaningless.").
97. See, e.g., EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d 1085, 1088-89 (5th Cir. 1987) (discuss-
ing failure to pay severance to a former employee).
98. See Rutherford, 565 F.2d at 1166; Hodgson v. Charles Martin Inspectors of Pe-
troleum, Inc., 459 F.2d 303, 306 (5th Cir. 1972).
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severance are typically based on the employer's policy99 or on the provi-
sions of a pre-termination employment contract and therefore are also
related to employment.o Because these post-employment practices
maintain a close connection to an employment relationship, such prac-
tices should fall within the scope of section 704(a).
Establishing such a connection becomes more difficult, however, when
the post-employment action, in isolation, is not typically related to an
employment relationship. For example, if a former employer physically
threatens a former employee 0 1 who files a section 704(a) claim, this con-
duct is not within the contemplated scope of an employment relation-
ship. Such threats arguably have no affect on a former employee's
previous or future working conditions and, therefore, are unrelated to an
employment relationship. In addition, there are no cases that have held
that section 704(a) protects former employees against threats by their
former employer. 102
It should be noted, however, that at least one circuit court has held
that threats, if made during the employment relationship, violate Title
VII.10 3 In Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced Rodmen Local 201, °4 the
99. See Cosmair, 821 F.2d at 1089.
100. See id. at 1087. In Cosmair, the court looked at the discontinuation of severance
pay in the context of the ADEA. The court cited Pantchenko v. C. B. Dolge, Co., 581
F.2d 1052, 1055 (2d Cir. 1978), and Rutherford, 565 F.2d at 1165-66, as support for the
proposition that former employees are covered under the ADEA as long as the post-
employment discrimination arises out of the employment relationship. See Cosmair, 821
F.2d at 1088. The court held that "[c]ertainly the discontinuance of severance pay arose
out of [the] employment relationship .... The company agreed to continue to pay...
salary and medical insurance premiums, and calculated the length of time payments
would continue based on the length of [the former employee's] tenure with the com-
pany." Id at 1089. See supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text for a comparison of
the anti-retaliation provisions of the ADEA and Title VII.
101. See; e.g., Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 492-93 (7th Cir. 1991) (reviewing plain-
tiff's allegations that she was physically attacked, shot at, and threatened by her former
employer).
102. See, e.g., id at 493 ("[I]t is an employee's discharge or other employment impair-
ment that evidences actionable retaliation, and not events subsequent to and unrelated to
employment.") (emphasis added). It should be noted that a district court sitting in the
Fourth Circuit held that a former employee of a bar had stated a claim under § 704(a)
where she alleged that when she returned to the bar as a customer, her former employer
had her arrested for trespassing in retaliation for her filing of a sex discrimination suit.
See Beckham v. Grand Affair of N.C., Inc., 671 F. Supp. 415, 419 (W.D.N.C. 1987).
However, the Beckham court noted that at the time of its opinion, the Fourth Circuit had
not yet addressed the issue of whether Title VII applied to former employees. Id. Be-
cause the Fourth Circuit subsequently addressed this issue in Polsby v. Chase, 970 F.2d
1360 (4th Cir. 1992), vacated on other grounds sub nor. Polsby v. Shalala, 113 S. Ct.
1940 (1993), Beckham presumably retains little persuasive value, although Polsby did not
discuss the Beckham decision.
103. Physical threats made during an employment relationship also have been held to
violate both the FLSA and the NLRA. See Ford v. Alfaro, 785 F.2d 835, 841 (9th Cir.
1986); McLane/Western, Inc. v. NLRB, 723 F.2d 1454, 1456-57 (10th Cir. 1983). See
supra notes 52-74 and accompanying text for a comparison of the FSLA, the NLRA, and
Title VII.
104. 843 F.2d 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1105 (1989).
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court held that "repeated threats against individuals in response to their
exercise of protected rights [under Title VII] may amount to harassment
sufficient to establish a claim of retaliation." ' 5 However, this harass-
ment occurred during the employment relationship and presumably af-
fected the employee's work environment. Unlike either actions that take
place during an employment relationship, such as threats by a current
employer, or post-employment actions that are related to an employment
relationship, such as referencing or payment of severance, post-employ-
ment threats are not "related to" or "connected to" an employment rela-
tionship.10 6 Because the first step of this test places the burden of proof
on the plaintiff, only those claims that the former employee proves are
sufficiently related to an employment relationship will be protected under
section 704(a).
B. Step Two: Establishing that the Conduct Was Retaliatory
Under Section 704(a)
The mere fact that a post-employment action is related to an employ-
ment relationship does not automatically entitle former employees to re-
lief under section 704(a). For example, an employer's refusal to provide
a reference does not alone violate section 704(a). 7 Instead, section
704(a) makes the dissemination of unfavorable references, or similar con-
duct, actionable only when the employer takes such actions in retaliation
for the employee's assertion of rights protected under Title VII.'
Therefore, the second step in this analysis requires proof that the post-
employment action was retaliatory as defined by section 704(a).
The Supreme Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 109
delineates the order and allocation of proof applied in Title VII cases. 10
Under the McDonnell Douglas approach, the plaintiff must first make a
prima facie showing of retaliation. In order to meet this burden, plain-
tiffs must show that: (1) they were engaged in protected activity; (2) they
suffered some disadvantageous employment action; and (3) there was a
causal link between the activity and the disadvantage such that the retali-
105. Id. at 1424.
106. See Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880, 883 & n.3 (9th Cir.
1980); Pantchenko v. C. B. Dolge Co., 581 F.2d 1052, 1055 (2d Cir. 1978).
107. See Pantchenko, 581 F.2d at 1055.
108. See supra note 3.
109. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
110. See Schlei & Grossman, supra note 58, at 557. One of the issues in McDonnell
Douglas that was considered by the Eighth Circuit but not appealed to the Supreme
Court was whether an employer's refusal to rehire an ex-employee violated Title VII.
The employee had participated in a "lock-in" demonstration and was subsequently de-
nied re-employment by his former employer. The Eighth Circuit considered the claim
and denied relief, holding that such demonstrations were not protected activity within the
meaning of § 704(a). See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 797. Because the individual
was not employed with the employer at the time the alleged retaliation took place, this
case is arguably another example of post-employment retaliation.
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atory motive played a part in the adverse employment action.II' Once a
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer
to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its conduct.' 2 If
the employer meets this burden, the burden then shifts back to the plain-
tiff to show that the asserted reason is pretextual.I 3
Applying the proposed two-step analysis to the facts of an actual
case114 illustrates the appropriate order and allocation of proof as applied
in the post-employment context. Bertha Rutherford, a loan officer-
trainee, resigned from the bank for which she worked ("the Bank") after
she was asked to perform certain clerical duties that she considered to be
a demotion. She subsequently filed a sex discrimination suit against the
Bank. Before learning of the discrimination suit, the Bank gave Ruther-
ford a "highly complimentary" recommendation letter." 5 When Ruth-
erford later contacted the Bank for an updated reference, however, the
Bank informed her that the reference would include the fact that she had
fied a sex discrimination charge against the Bank. When a prospective
employer requested references concerning Rutherford's employment ap-
plication, the Bank disclosed the fact of the pending suit, and Rutherford
was denied the job.' 16
In order to establish a cause of action under section 704(a), the plain-
tiff must establish a prima facie case of retaliation. The McDonnell
Douglas test1 17 first requires Rutherford to show that she was engaged in
a protected activity. Rutherford's filing of a sex discrimination charge
against the Bank constitutes protected activity within the meaning of sec-
tion 704(a)."' Second, Rutherford's failure to obtain a new job estab-
lishes that she suffered some disadvantageous employment action. Last,
Rutherford must demonstrate a causal link between the Bank's retalia-
tory action and the disadvantage. The Bank gave Rutherford a favorable
reference until she filed the discrimination charge. All subsequent refer-
111. See Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 708 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1023 (1990); Jordan v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1368, 1376 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Cohen v.
Fred Meyer, Inc., 686 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989));
Waddell v. Small Tube Prods., Inc., 799 F.2d 69, 73 (3d Cir. 1986); Chojar v. Levitt, 773
F. Supp. 645, 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Schlei & Grossman, supra note 58, at 534, 557-62.
112. See Jall, 873 F.2d at 708; Jordan, 847 F.2d at 1376; Schlei & Grossman, supra
note 58, at 557.
113. See Jordan, 847 F.2d at 1376; Jall, 873 F.2d at 706-07; Schlei & Grossman, supra
note 58, at 557, 560-62. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court further clarified the
McDonnell Douglas scheme. In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742(1993), the Court held that although the burden of production shifts to the defendant to
provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions, the burden of persuasion
remains at all times with the plaintiff. Id. at 2747. Therefore, even if a court determines
that the employer's reasons are pretextual, the plaintiff is not entitled to judgment as a
matter of law unless it meets its ultimate burden of proof. Id at 2748-49.
114. See Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1977).
115. See id at 1163.
116. See id
117. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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ences included the fact about the pending charge. Only then did her
future employers deny her employment. These facts are sufficient to es-
tablish that the Bank's retaliatory motive played a part in Rutherford's
failure to obtain a new job.I19
Once the plaintiff proves a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to
the employer to give a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its ac-
tions. The Bank gave Rutherford a highly complimentary recommenda-
tion before she filed the Title VII charge. After she filed the charge, the
Bank qualified its recommendations to future employers by stating that
Rutherford had fied the charge. Because Rutherford had a good em-
ployment record and a favorable recommendation before she filed the
charge, the Bank would find it difficult to articulate a legitimate reason
for the adverse references. Even if the Bank did articulate some reason
for its actions, Rutherford would probably not find it difficult to demon-
strate that such a reason was pretextual 12 0-- especially in light of the
Bank's disclosure of the pending suit to Rutherford's future employers.
The two-step analysis proposed above would ensure that (1) the post-
employment action is related to an employment relationship, and (2) the
action was in retaliation to the assertion of a right protected under Title
VII. This test would balance congressional intent in enacting Title VII
against the potential for unlimited employer liability by defining and lim-
iting the post-employment actions covered by section 704(a).
CONCLUSION
Although reading section 704(a) to exclude former employees would
provide a bright-line interpretation of the provision's meaning, such a
restrictive reading overlooks congressional intent in the enactment of Ti-
tle VII. In addition, broad judicial construction of other Title VII provi-
sions, as well as consistent interpretation of analogous provisions within
other remedial labor statutes, support the proposition that section 704(a)
should protect former employees against acts of retaliation. In order to
prevent abuse of the statutory protections when applied in the post-em-
ployment context, section 704(a) should protect only those post-employ-
ment actions that relate to an employment relationship. In addition, the
traditional approach to the order and allocation of proof in Title VII
cases, as delineated in McDonnell Douglas,121 ensures that these post-
employment actions are in fact retaliatory as defined by section 704(a).
119. See, e.g., Burrus v. United Tel. Co., 683 F.2d 339, 343 (10th Cir.) ("The causal
connection may be demonstrated by evidence of circumstances that justify an inference of
retaliatory motive, such as protected conduct closely followed by adverse action.") (cita-
tions omitted), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982).
120. See Schlei & Grossman, supra note 58, at 560-62; supra note 113.
121. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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